

#### Accelerate Your Development of Secured Microservices in the Cloud with IBM Cloud Hyper Protect Containers

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## Please note


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## 66

Within one Kubernetes pod, access credentials were exposed to Tesla's AWS environment which contained an Amazon S3 bucket that had sensitive data such as telemetry.

# US government payment site leaks 14 million customer records

GovPayNow.com says customers are safe, despite the breach.



#### 73%

## Allow root access

#### 2%

Corporate data encrypted

# **58%** Threats from insiders

https://www-01.ibm.com/marketing/iwm/dre/signup?source=urx-17425&S\_PKG=ov59678& https://www.techrepublic.com/article/tesla-public-cloud-environment-hacked-attackers-accessed-non-public-company-data/ https://healthitsecurity.com/news/58-of-healthcare-phi-data-breaches-caused-by-insiders


## "Move to the cloud"?


### "Move to the cloud"?













# **Improving application development**


- Recognition that an app isn't just the source code: libraries etc.
- DevOps encourages ownership by the dev team
- Test, lift, drop, deploy
- Containers as lightweight alternative to VMs



# **Orchestrate your containers**

- Kubernetes
- HA
- Load balancing
- Master, worker nodes





## **Apps with SPI?**

- Rewrite yourselves
  - Encrypt the data... all of it? Metadata?
- Security consultancy
- How to lock it down?


#### Why should I care about containers' security?

#### KROMTECH

Because.....

https://kromtech.com/blog/security-center/cryptojacking-invades-cloud-how-modern-containerization-trend-is-exploited-by-attackers

<u>Kromtech</u> > <u>Blog</u> > <u>Security Center</u> > Cryptojacking invades cloud. How modern containerization trend is exploited by attackers **SECURITY CENTER** 



Cryptojacking invades cloud. How modern containerization trend is exploited by attackers

.... Menu

2018-06-12 | By Security Center

Kromtech Security Center found **17** malicious docker images stored on Docker Hub for an entire year. Even after several complaints on GitHub and Twitter, research made by sysdig.com and fortinet.com, cybercriminals continued to enlarge their malware armory on Docker Hub. With more than **5 million** pulls, the docker123321 registry is considered a springboard for cryptomining containers. Today's growing number of publicly accessible misconfigured orchestration platforms like Kubernetes allows hackers to create a fully automated tool that forces these platforms to mine Monero. By pushing malicious images to a Docker Hub registry and pulling it from the victim's system, hackers were able to

# net?

er-crypto-mining-botnet.html

TRM

#### **Docker service configuration**

Running the Docker daemon requires root privileges, which has some security implications.

The most one important is to control **who** has access to the (local) Docker Unix socket used to control the Docker daemon.

Most distributions packages change the group ownership of the Docker socket from root to docker, allowing users member of the docker group to gain control of the daemon (without using *sudo*).

blockchain@blkchndemo:~\$ ls -al /var/run/docker.sock
srw-rw---- 1 root docker 0 Sep 3 16:54 /var/run/docker.sock
blockchain@blkchndemo:~\$ id blockchain
uid=1001(blockchain) gid=1001(blockchain) groups=1001(blockchain),0(root),119(docker)
blockchain@blkchndemo:~\$

Carefully evaluate and control who is given access to the docker group

Should you need access to the Docker daemon over the network, make sure TLS is configured appropriately to secure the access to the HTTP socket.

By default, the processes are running inside the container with **root** privileges.

How many times have I been bitten by files I couldn't edit on the host because they were created in the container and by root ? I've lost count...

[guigui@t460 Org1 (master \*%=)]\$ ls -al total 100 drwxr-xr-x. 3 root root 4096 Aug 27 14:59 . drwxr-xr-x. 5 root root 4096 Aug 27 14:59 . -rw-r--r-. 1 root root 786 Aug 27 14:59 ca-cert.pem -rw-r--r-. 1 root root 16031 Aug 27 14:59 fabric-ca-server-config.yaml -rw-r--r-. 1 root root 61440 Aug 27 14:59 fabric-ca-server.db -rw-r--r-. 1 root root 61440 Aug 27 14:59 fabric-ca-server.db -rw-r--r-. 1 root root 843 Aug 27 14:59 IssuerPublicKey -rw-r--r-. 1 root root 215 Aug 27 14:59 IssuerRevocationPublicKey drwxr-xr-x. 3 root root 4096 Aug 27 14:59 msp

Now imagine what could possibly go wrong if a process does rm a mapped volume from the host ? It depends! On the volume.

If possible, prefer using a non-privileged user to run processes inside your containers.

How to check if the processes are running as users or as root?

• Log into the container and look at the output of the ps command:

blockchain@blkchndemo:~/v1.1.x\$ docker exec -it peer2.1 ps faux											
ι	JSER	PID	%CPU	%MEM	VSZ	RSS TTY	STAT	START	TIME	COMMAND	
1	root	15	0.0	0.0	34424	2704 pts/0	Rs+	13:28	0:00	ps faux	
1 1	root	1	1.6	0.1	311944	21748 ?	Ssl	13:28	0:00	peer node start	

blockchair	n@blkc	hnder	no:~/\	/1.1.x\$	docker	r exec	-it pee	r2.1 ps	faux	
USER	PID	%CPU	%MEM	VSZ	RSS	TTY	STAT	START	TIME	COMMAND
root	42	2.0	0.0	20252	3252	pts/0	Ss	13:30	0:00	bash
root	49	0.0	0.0	17500	2116	pts/0	R+	13:30	0:00	\_ ps faux
root	1	0.0	0.0	20068	2828	?	Ss	13:30	0:00	/bin/bash /docker-entrypoint.sh peer node start
root	24	0.0	0.0	44764	2692	?	S	13:30	0:00	su fabric -c peer node start
fabric	25	0.0	0.0	4340	708	?	Ss	13:30	0:00	\_ sh -c peer node start
fabric	26	1.4	0.1	328164	24320	?	S1	13:30	0:00	\_ peer node start

• Inspect the container from the host:

blockchain@blkchndemo:~/v1.1.x\$ docker inspect peer2.1 --format '{{ .Id }}: User={{ .Config.User }}'
d468cae1409f9811662606a3fba69cc52b97689a41a78c5e44236c6c30baaac3: User=


If User is not set, there was no USER specified in the Dockerfile.

Docker containers are all about reuse:

- Reusing existing code layers, as a result of successive images creation.
- Reusing existing images as base for your own.

Docker provides thousands of base images (of varying quality) through the <u>Docker Hub</u> and the <u>Docker Store</u>:

- Docker Hub claims 1M+ images available from the community
- Docker Store has 226 images available.



TRM

With so many images to choose from, it is key to carefully select the base image to use to build your containers.

TRM

As a general recommendation, I would advise:

- To select images from the Docker Store whenever possible
- To use the vendor-provided Docker images
- To stick to well established providers.

It is usually reasonnable to assume that the smaller the base image, the least vulnerable the container. But it may have performance implications that need to be reviewed.

In order to assist with the vulnerability assessment of the base images stored by Docker, the Hub provides a security scanning mechanisms where images will be scanned when uploaded to the repository.

## **IBM Cloud Hyper Protect Services**

IBM-hosted services:

IBM Cloud Hyper Protect Crypto Services

IBM Cloud Hyper Protect DBaaS

**IBM Cloud Hyper Protect Containers** 

## **IBM Cloud Hyper Protect Services**

IBM-hosted services:


IBM Cloud Hyper Protect Crypto Services

IBM Cloud Hyper Protect DBaaS

**IBM Cloud Hyper Protect Containers** 

## **Cloud computing**


- Abstract away the infrastructure
- Who do you trust?



## **Attack vectors**

- Insider threat: sysprogs
- Remote access
- Privilege escalation

### **Existing cloud**



## **Existing cloud**


Docker


Linux

Worker 1


## **Hyper Protect cloud**

EAL5+





## **Secure Service Containers**



- No system admin access
- Data at rest, transport protection
- Once the appliance image is built, OS access (ssh) is not possible
- Memory access disabled
- Encrypted disk
- Debug data (dumps) encrypted
- Signed docker images
- Secure boot

#### Demo

# ibm.com/cloud/hyper-protect-services

#### **IBM Hyper Protect Services**

Protect your data with a solution designed to offer high reliability and data solution isolation

False

Sign up for experimental

Read the blog

2-y+n...} #selection at the end -add mirror ob.select=1

modifier ob.select 1 y+2a)

mieror mod.use v

mirror mod.use

#### Your security priorities matter

Whether you're securing data in core business applications, reducing insider threats or meeting audit and compliance obligations, your data deserves the best protection.

582.9M

data records compromised in 2015<sup>1</sup>

financial records compromised in 2015<sup>2</sup>

xn {x-12-y+n...

1+x+y+2a)-(3a+

5+x+k+2a+21



#### Creating an app, want encryption to tick the compliance boxes?

#### • Security without code change

- Cloud-hosted Kubernetes, DBaaS, and crypto services
- Starter kits
- Trial offerings

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   http://conferences.gse.org.uk/2018/feedback/CA
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